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CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEMS IN EUROPE
AND THE UNITED STATES
HEIN KÖTZ*
I.  INTRODUCTION
Allow me first to say what an honor it is to be invited to present
Duke’s first Herbert L. Bernstein Memorial Lecture.  Herbert’s death
at the Law School a little more than a year ago was a great shock not
only to the Duke Law School community but also to the many friends
he had in Germany.  I knew him for nearly 40 years, and I am very
grateful indeed for this opportunity to pay tribute to him and his con-
tribution to the law and legal education.
When Dean Bartlett agreed to the topic of my lecture she must
have realised that letting a foreign lawyer touch upon American civil
procedure would be a hazardous affair.  Not only is a foreign lawyer
who ventures into this field bound sooner or later to fall into error,
but also he will expect you to forgive him and kindly put him right
when he does so.  Not only is he apt to rush in where local angels fear
to tread, but also courtesy may require you to call his views original
and refreshing when they are heretical or bizarre.  There is one coun-
tervailing argument supporting the choice of my subject, however,
and that is that it was very dear to Herbert’s heart.  He and I dis-
cussed it on many occasions, and while we both felt that comparing
the machinery of civil justice in the common law and the civil law was
a most challenging and interesting undertaking, we also agreed that it
was a subject fraught with greater risks of fundamental misunder-
standing of foreign law than those which beset the comparative en-
deavours in substantive law.1
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1. Herbert L. Bernstein, Whose Advantage After All?: A Comment on the Comparison of
Civil Justice Systems, 21 U. CAL. DAVIS 587 (1988).
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Our shared interest in the comparison of civil justice systems
goes back to the early 1960s when both Herbert and I were graduate
students at the University of Michigan Law School.  All graduate stu-
dents with a European Law background were given an introductory
course on American Law.  Procedure was an important subject of this
course, and adversariness was held up to us as the hallmark of the
American procedural system.  The introductory course itself followed
the adversary model in that we were asked to read Roscoe Pound’s
celebrated article on the “Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the
Administration of Justice” with its sharp attack on the excesses of the
adversary system.2  We were told that Jerome Frank had described
the American mode of trials as being based on what he called the
“fight theory”, a theory which in his view “derives from the origin of
trials as substitutes for private out-of-court brawls” and “fre-
quently . . . blocks the uncovering of vital evidence or leads to a pres-
entation of vital testimony in a way that distorts it.”3  At the time,
however, this had no great impact on us.  We were enthralled to
watch lawyer-dominated civil and criminal trials at the Ann Arbour
Circuit Court on closed-circuit television in a viewing room at the
Law School.  We also enjoyed the moot court cases with their colour-
ful and dramatic confrontation between partisan student advocates,
and any lingering doubts about the attractions of adversariness were
dispelled by reading Earl Stanley Gardner, Raymond Chandler and
Robert Traver’s novel entitled Anatomy of a Murder.4
For those of us who remained in contact with American law,
however, a gradual process of disenchantment set in.  Like most
readers of Robert Traver’s novel we were delighted by the defen-
dant’s acquittal on the basis of a successful plea of impaired mental
capacity.  But the not-guilty verdict was based on facts supplied by
the defendant only after his lawyer had impressed upon him what
type of fact would constitute that defence.  Can it be right to allow or
even require a lawyer to arm his client for effective perjury?  There
were other questions we asked.  It is all very well to say that cross-
examination is, in the words of John Wigmore, “the greatest legal en-
gine ever invented for the discovery of truth” and that it is a most ef-
2. Roscoe Pound, Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Amdministration of Justice,
40 AM. L. REV. 729 (1906).
3. See Jerome Frank, Courts on Trial: Myth and Reality, in AMERICAN JUSTICE 80 – 90
(1949).
4. ROBERT TRAVER, ANATOMY OF A MURDER (1958).
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fective weapon to test dishonest witnesses and ferret out the truth.5
But isn’t it a weapon equally lethal to heroes and villains? There is no
doubt that all procedural systems aim at an intelligent inquiry into all
the practically available evidence in order to ascertain, as near as may
be, the truth about the facts.  But suppose a business man were to de-
cide whether or not to build a new plant: Would he think of obtaining
the needed information by subjecting his informants to the experi-
ence of standing as a witness at a common law trial?  Is there no more
business-like method to unearth the relevant facts?
II.  CIVIL PROCEDURE IN GERMANY
It is indeed a routine business meeting an American lawyer will
believe he is attending when he is led into a German courtroom.6
What is most likely to strike him is the fact that mainly the court con-
ducts the interrogation of witnesses.7  It is the court that will ask for
the witness’s name, age, occupation, and residence.8  It is the court
that will then invite the witness to narrate, without undue interrup-
tion, what he knows about the matter on which he has been called.
After the witness has given his story in his or her own words the court
will ask questions designed to test, clarify, and amplify it.  It is then
the turn of counsel for the parties to formulate pertinent questions.
But in an ordinary case there is relatively little questioning by counsel
for the parties, at least by common law standards.  One reason is that
the judge will normally have covered the ground.  Another reason is
that for counsel to examine at length after the court seemingly has
exhausted the witness might appear to imply that the court does not
know its business, which is a dubious tactic.  There is no cross-
examination in the sense of the common law, nor is there a full steno-
5. JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1387, at 29 (3d ed. 1940).
6. For more detailed information in English on the German civil justice system, see the
seminal study by Benjamin Kaplan, Arthur T. von Mehren & Rudolf Schaefer, Phases of Ger-
man Civil Procedure (pts. 1& 2), 71 HARV. L. REV. 1193, 1443 (1958), now over 40 years old but
fundamentally accurate.  Comparative articles based on this study are Benjamin Kaplan, Civil
Procedure – Reflections on the Comparison of Systems, 9 BUFF. L. REV. 409 (1960); William B.
Fisch, Recent Developments in West German Civil Procedure, 6 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L.
REV. 221 (1983); Arthur T. von Mehren, Some Comparative Reflections on First Instance Civil
Procedure: Recent Reforms in German Civil Procedure and in the Federal Rules, 63 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 609 (1988). See also David J. Gerber, Extraterritorial Discovery and the Conflict
of Procedural Systems: Germany and the United States, 34 AM. J. COMP. L. 745, 748– 69 (1986).
7. Michael Bohlander, The German Advantage Revisited: An Inside View of German Civil
Procedure in The Nineties, 13 TUL. EUR. & CIV. L.F. 25, 43 (1998).
8. Kaplan, von Mehren & Schaefer, supra note 6, at 1234-35.
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graphic transcript of the testimony.  Instead, the judge himself pauses
from time to time to dictate a summary of what the witness has said
so far.9  At the close of testimony the clerk will read back the dictated
summary in full, and either witness or counsel may suggest improve-
ments in the wording.  If the exact phrasing of a particular part of the
testimony is believed to be of critical importance, counsel may insist
on having it set down verbatim in the minutes.
A similar system is used with respect to expert witnesses.  Sup-
pose a case requires an expert’s evidence, for example an action for
damages brought by a patient against his physician on the ground of
the defendant’s failure to use ordinary care in his treatment.  In Ger-
many, as indeed in most Continental countries, the expert will be se-
lected and appointed by the court after consultation with the parties.10
It is the court that will conduct his examination, and it is the court
that will advance the expert’s fees eventually to be borne by the los-
ing party.11  In the common law it is up to the parties, or rather their
lawyers, to find suitable experts who will then be examined and cross-
examined in the same way as ordinary witnesses.  I have served both
as a court-appointed expert on foreign law in cases pending before a
German court, and as party-selected expert witness on German law in
litigation before the High Court in London, and I assure you that
there are substantial differences between the two roles.  As a court-
appointed expert you are an ally and partner of the court.  You assist
the court to the best of your ability in reaching a correct result, and it
is with the court that your duty of loyalty lies.  What struck me most
in my role as party-selected expert witness in the English cases was
not the experience of being examined and cross-examined, but the
difficulty to resist the subtle temptation to join your client’s team, to
take your client’s side, to conceal doubts, to overstate the strong and
downplay the weak aspects of his case and to dampen any scruples
you might have by reminding yourself that the other side will select
and instruct another expert witness and that, when the dust has set-
tled, the truth will triumph.
9. John Langbein, The German Advantage In Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 828
(1985) [hereinafter German Advantage].
10. Id. at 835-41.
11. For a detailed and accurate description of the process of selecting, instructing and ex-
amining experts in Germany, see id.  Much of what follows on the characteristic features of
German civil procedure is based on this brilliant article. See also Bohlander, supra note 7, at 41-
43.
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The examination of witnesses in the Continental style may not be
free from certain risks.  One might say, for example, that the tech-
nique of inviting the witness to tell his story in narrative form and
without undue interruption provides an incentive, in the interest of
presenting a conclusive, logically coherent, and convincing story, to
fill in gaps by half-truths or fiction.  There is also a danger that the
judge, in acting as chief-examiner of the witnesses, may sooner or
later appear to favour one side over the other.  By putting questions
to the witness, in the words of Lord Denning, he “drops the mantle of
the judge, and assumes the robe of an advocate.”12  In general, how-
ever, a competent judge in questioning witnesses knows how to play
his cards close to his chest.  If he pursued one line of questioning with
undue vigour or in some other way revealed his evaluation of the tes-
timony this would at any rate have no influence on a jury as the sole
trier of facts because there are no civil juries on the Continent, and
not even in the United Kingdom.  As to counsel, they may ask follow-
up questions as an antidote against unfair or incompetent questioning
by the judge.13
On the other hand, under the Continental system there is no
need, as in common law jurisdictions, to prepare the prospective wit-
ness for counsel’s questions during the examination-in-chief and
cross-examination.14  Consequently, the “coaching” or “sandpaper-
ing” of witnesses is not a problem.  Indeed, German lawyers will gen-
erally be reluctant to engage in extensive out-of-court contact with
prospective witnesses.15  A canon of professional ethics promulgated
by the German Bar Association in 1973 provided that out-of-court
contact with witnesses was advisable only when special circumstances
justified it and was at any rate limited to clarifying what the witness
would be able to say.16  This rule was dropped when new provisions
12. Jones v. National Coal Board, [1957] 2 Q.B. 55, 63.
13. Bohlander, supra note 7, at 43.
14. Langbein, German Advantage, supra note 9, at 835-37.
15. Kaplan, von Mehren, Schaefer, supra note 6, at 1200-01.
16. Section 6, entitled Questioning and Advising of Witnesses, provides as follows:
(1) The lawyer may question persons out of court who might be considered witnesses if
this is necessary with a view to the obligation to provide for clarification of facts, ad-
vice or representation.  (2) The lawyer may inform these persons as regards their rights
and duties as well as give advice to them.  (3) The lawyer is allowed to establish a rec-
ord of such questioning and to have the person sign a declaration. Such a record may
be used by the lawyer in order to confront the witness with these statements in a judi-
cial or administrative proceeding.  However, the lawyer may present the record itself
only in exceptional cases to the court or the administrative agency, for example, in
those cases where the witness is unable to testify in the pre-trial discovery stage or
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on professional ethics were enacted in 1996, probably because there
seemed no need for it.17  After all, it is fairly clear to an attorney that
the judge would take a dim view of the reliability of a witness who
previously had been closeted for long periods with counsel.
Civil procedure in Germany and in other civil law jurisdictions
differs from the American system by making the judge responsible for
the selection of expert witnesses, for the examination-in-chief of both
fact and expert witnesses, and for creating the record based on those
examinations.18  The judge’s conspicuous role in the actual taking of
evidence, especially in the taking of witness testimony, has led com-
mon lawyers to label Continental civil procedure as “inquisitorial” or
“non-adversarial”.  This is misleading because it conjures up the
Spanish Inquisition, Kafka’s castle, and bureaucratic omnipotence
and has indeed led an English judge to say, in comparing English and
Continental procedure, that “our national experience found that jus-
tice is more likely to ensue from adversary than from inquisitorial
procedures – Inquisition and Star Chamber were decisive, and knowl-
edge of recent totalitarian methods has merely rammed the lesson
home.”19  In my view, however, this is not only misleading, but also
downright wrong.  All arguments generally praising the virtues of the
adversarial system of the common law and contrasting them with the
vices of the inquisitorial system ascribed to the civil law are misguided
and, in Herbert Bernstein’s words, “cannot advance, even by an inch,
the comparative analysis of German and American civil procedure.”20
The truth is that both in the American and Continental civil jus-
tice systems, the power to establish the facts on which the judicial de-
cision rests is reserved to the decision-makers, whether the trial judge
or jury in the United States, or the court on the Continent.21  On the
other hand, it is in both systems exclusively for the parties and their
lawyers to identify the facts they think will support the claim or de-
fence, to make the appropriate factual allegations, and to nominate
during the proceedings. [. . .]  (5) In any event, the appearance of undue influence is to
be avoided.
GRUNDSAETZE DES ANWALTLICHEN STANDESRECHTS, HRICHTLINIEN GEMAESS § 177
ABSATZ 2 NR. 2 BUNDESRECHTSANWALTSORDNUNG (BRAO).
17. See new provisions of BRAO available at http://jurcom5juris.de/bundsrecht/brao/index.
html.
18. Langbein, German Advantage, supra note 9, at 835-36.
19. D. v. National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children, [1978] A.C. 171, 231.
20. Bernstein, supra note 1, at 589-90.
21. von Mehren, supra note 6, at 609.
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the witnesses and the facts of which they allegedly have knowledge.
In the United States, just as on the Continent, the civil courts must
work with what they are given, and they must establish the factual ba-
sis of their judgments from the materials the parties supply, and no
others.  Facts not in dispute between the parties are beyond judicial
scrutiny, nor can the judge do anything about a fact alleged by one
party and not specifically challenged by the opponent.  He must take
that fact as established and if he believes that the facts presented by
the parties are not true he has no power to unearth what he thinks
might be the truth by introducing independent evidence.  True, this
does not apply to criminal procedure.  In a criminal case the Conti-
nental judge may disregard the defendant’s guilty plea or a confession
or admission and introduce independent evidence, including witness
testimony, to determine what is called the “material truth” (materielle
Wahrheit).  In civil matters, however, the principle of “formal truth”
(formelle Wahrheit) applies.  “Formal truth” is what the court, to the
best of its ability, believes to be true having regard to the evidence
placed before it by the parties.  The court’s task is to do, and be seen
to be doing, justice between the parties; it is not to ascertain some in-
dependent truth.  It often happens, from the imperfection of evi-
dence, or the withholding of it, sometimes by the party in whose fa-
vour it would tell if presented, that an adjudication has to be made
which is not, and is known not to be, the whole truth of the matter.
Yet provided the decision has been in accordance with the available
evidence and with the law, justice will have been fairly done.
It follows that in their own ways both the German and American
systems are adversary systems of civil procedure.22  In both systems
the lawyers advance partisan positions from first pleadings to final ar-
guments.  In both systems the parties and their lawyers investigate
and identify in their briefs the facts they think will support their
claims and defences.  In both systems the court cannot go beyond the
parties’ factual contentions nor can the court strike out on its own in
the search for what it believes might be the real truth.
III.  PROCEDURAL CONTRASTS IN
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
To be sure, quite a few features of German civil procedure are in
marked contrast to American practises.  First there is the judge’s
22. Langbein, German Advantage, supra note 9, at 841-48.
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prominent role in the actual taking of witness testimony.23  This
should not be overrated, however, because the judge, even though he
serves as the examiner-in-chief of the witnesses, is prohibited from
inducing them to testify on facts other than those for which they were
named.  Another characteristic of German and indeed Continental
civil procedure is that no party is allowed to call as many witnesses as
he pleases.  There is no rule requiring all of plaintiff’s witnesses to be
heard before the defendant’s witnesses, nor is there a compulsion to
take proof on all the apparently contested issues at one sitting or to
call first the witnesses nominated by the party carrying the burden of
proof.
What the parties can do and will do is to nominate witnesses in
support of specific factual allegations.24  It is then for the court to
make an evidentiary order identifying the witnesses to be heard, de-
scribing with some precision the facts on which each witness is to be
examined and fixing the order in which they are to be called.  In
making this evidentiary order the court will consult with the parties
who will direct the court’s attention to particularly cogent lines of in-
quiry.  However, the final decision rests with the court whose discre-
tion will be guided by a strict standard of relevance as well as by the
principle that evidence is to be taken only to the extent and in the or-
der most likely to result in a speedy disposal of the case.
If, for example, witnesses have been nominated for a factual con-
tention, which the judge believes on legal grounds to be immaterial to
the party’s claim or defence, he will not allow the witness to be called.
Nor will he order the examination of a witness in support of a factual
allegation, which the judge finds is not really in dispute between the
parties or which has not been specifically challenged by the opposi-
tion.  If the court perceives that there is a matter that is likely to be
determinative, it may confine the evidentiary order to that matter and
await the results before issuing a further evidentiary order.  Suppose
that in a seller’s action for the price the buyer’s defense is, first, that
no contract was formed; second, that the goods delivered were defec-
tive; and, third, that in any event the seller’s claim is barred by the
Statute of Limitations.  In this situation it is within the judge’s discre-
23. Id. at 832-35.
24. Ronald J. Allen, Stefan Kock, Kurt Riecherberg & D. Toby Rosen, The German Ad-
vantage in Civil Procedure: A Plea For More Details and Fewer Generalities in Comparative
Scholarship, 32 NW. U. L. REV. 705, 720-21 (1988).
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tion to select the defense most likely to lead to a dismissal of the ac-
tion, and to postpone consideration of the other defences.
In a brilliant, if controversial, article John Langbein character-
ised the German procedural system as one in which the gathering of
the facts was entrusted to, and controlled by, the judge.25  In his view,
judicially-dominated fact-gathering is the hallmark of the German
system and constitutes the major “German advantage” as compared
with the system prevailing in the United States.  I am not sure
whether it is wholly appropriate to describe the court’s job as that of
“gathering the facts”.  After all, it is the parties and their lawyers who
will investigate the facts, discuss them with their clients, select what
will be presented to the court, indicate means of proof, and thus
“gather” the factual materials with which the court must work.26  This
is why the German system is an adversarial system.  However, once
the parties have supplied the factual materials and the time has come
to investigate the truth of the parties’ allegations, evaluate the evi-
dence, and find the facts on which the decision is to be based, the
German judge has fairly strong control over the procedure.27  He may
disregard proof offers, which, according to strict criteria of relevance,
might safely be overlooked.  Nor are there any binding rules on se-
quence, such as “plaintiff’s case before defendant’s case.”  Instead the
judge is encouraged to range over the entire case and concentrate the
inquiry on those issues most likely to result in an expeditious disposal
of the matter.  While the court can only call witnesses nominated by
the parties, it does exercise discretion as to the order and number of
the witnesses and plays a vigorous role in acting as the examiner-in-
chief of the witnesses.
John Langbein’s attack on American civil procedure and his
praise for the German counterpart have stirred up a lively debate in
this country.28  Some critics accept that strengthening the court’s role
25. Langbein, German Advantage, supra note 9.
26. Allen, Kock, Reichenberg & Rosen, supra note 24 at 722-26.
27. Id. at 727.
28. See Samuel R. Gross, The American Advantage: The Value of Inefficient Litigation, 85
MICH. L. REV. 734 (1987); Allen, Kock, Reichenberg & Rosen, supra note 26. See also Lang-
bein’s reply: John Langbein, Trashing the German Advantage, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 763 (1988)
and the rebuttal: Ronald Allen, Idealization and Caricature in Comparative Scholarship, 82 NW.
U. L. REV. 785 (1988). For a thoughtful critical reaction to Langbein’s article, see John C. Reitz,
Why We Probably Cannot Adopt the German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 75 IOWA L. REV.
987 (1990).  I found this article most helpful for the following discussion, although perhaps not
always in a direction that John Reitz would have preferred.
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in the evidentiary process would save time and money, reduce the
wastefulness and complexity of pre-trial and trial procedure, and cut
down on the distortions inherent in the system of partisan preparation
and production of witnesses and experts.29  They argue, nevertheless,
that such a move would be incompatible with the traditional roles of
lawyers and judges in this country and fly in the face of significant and
ineradicable features of American legal culture.30  On the one hand,
John Langbein has rightly admonished us not “to allow the cry of
‘cultural differences’ to become the universal apologetic that perma-
nently sheathes the status quo against criticism based upon compara-
tive example.”31  On the other hand, cultural differences do explain
something of why institutional and procedural differences arise in dif-
ferent legal systems and why transplanting legal institutions from one
society to another may be more difficult in one case than in another.
The important question is what weight to attach to this factor for pre-
sent purposes.  John Langbein’s answer is: “Not much.”32
But this is surely a point on which reasonable people may differ.
The possibility of transplanting legal institutions is indeed one of the
most controversial topics of comparative law.33  It is also a topic much
ventilated these days in Europe.  We are currently embarking in
Europe on a process of unifying the contract law of the Member
States.34  Although work on a Uniform European Code of Contract
Law has not yet received the official blessing of the European Com-
mission, the academic debate on what is surely the largest current
comparative law enterprise in Europe is intense.  In this debate, a
small but articulate minority holds the view that each of the Euro-
pean nations is the product of a unique legal, political, and social his-
tory and that each nation’s social and political values and goals are so
29. Gross, supra note 28, at 752-56.
30. Oscar G. Chase, Legal Process and National Culture, 5 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L.
1, 7-9 (1997).
31. Langbein, German Advantage, supra note 9, at 855; see also John Langbein, Cultural
Chauvinism in Comparative Law, 5 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 41 (1997) [hereinafter Cul-
tural Chauvinism].
32. Langbein, Cultural Chauvinism, supra note 31, at 48-49.
33. See, e.g.,.ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE
LAW (2d ed. 1993); Alan Watson, Legal Transplants and Law Reform, 92 Law Q. REV. 79
(1976). See also the debate between Otto Kahn-Freund, On Uses and Misuses of Comparative
Law, 37 MOD. L. REV. 1 (1974) and Eric Stein, Uses, Misuses – and Nonuses of Comparative
Law, 72 NW. L. REV. 198 (1977).
34. See Law Reform Projects, European Contract Law, available at http://www.jura.uni-
freiburg.de/ipr1/reform.html.
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different that the unification of law in Europe, like the merger of the
French, English and German languages, is a barren and pointless ex-
ercise and indeed a chimera.35
I do not share this view.  There is today what Oliver Wendell
Holmes might have called a far-reaching free trade in legal ideas in all
that relates to economic activity, trade and transport, banking, and in-
surance.  In these fields, the possibility of transplanting legal institu-
tions and indeed of unifying the law should not be ruled out at the
start because of supposed cross-cultural differences.  However, we are
concerned here not with business-related fields of substantive law, but
with procedure.  There is much to be said for the view that all rules
organizing constitutional, legislative, administrative, or judicial pro-
cedures are deeply rooted in a country’s peculiar features of history,
social structure, and political consensus and as such are more resistant
to transplantation.  “Procedural law is tough law”, said Otto Kahn-
Freund.  Since “all that concerns the technique of legal practice is
likely to resist change” he concluded that “comparative law has far
greater utility in substantive law than in the law of procedure, and the
attempt to use foreign models of judicial organization and procedure
may lead to frustration and may thus be a misuse of the comparative
method.”36
Must we accept this as the last word on the matter?  Another dis-
tinguished comparative lawyer and proceduralist, Arthur von Me-
hren, reached a different conclusion.  While not challenging the view
that a procedural system’s general structure and principal features
express society’s social and political values and goals he nevertheless
said that “very real differences between first-instance procedural ar-
rangements in the United States, on the one hand, and in France and
Germany, on the other, derive much less from differences in social or
political values or in institutional, sociological, or psychological as-
sumptions than from the institutional fact of the concentrated or dis-
continuous nature of the trial.”37
35. See, e.g., Pierre Legrand, Book Review, 58 MOD. L. REV. 262 (1995); Pierre Legrand,
European Legal Systems are Not Converging, 45 INT. & COMP. L. Q. 52 (1996); Pierre Le-
grand, Against a European Civil Code, 60 MOD. L. REV. 44 (1997).
36. Kahn-Freund, supra note 33, at 20.
37. Arthur von Mehren, The Significance for Procedural Practice and Theory of the Con-
centrated Trial: Comparative Remarks, in: 2 EUROPÄISCHES RECHTSDENKEN IN GESCHICHTE
UND GEGENWART, FESTSCHRIFT FÜR HELMUT COING 361, 362 (München 1982).
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One salient characteristic of European civil procedure lies indeed
in the fact that it is wholly unfamiliar with, and knows nothing of, the
idea of a “trial” as a single, temporally continuous presentation in
which all materials are made available to the adjudicator.  Instead
proceedings in a civil action on the Continent may be described as a
series of isolated conferences before the judge, some of which may
last only a few minutes, in which written communications between the
parties are exchanged and discussed, procedural rulings are made,
evidence is introduced and testimony taken until the cause is finally
ripe for adjudication.38  Procedure in the common law jurisdictions, on
the other hand, has been deeply influenced by the institution of the
jury.39  Since a jury cannot be convened, dismissed and recalled from
time to time over an extended period, a common-law trial must be
staged as a concentrated courtroom drama, a continuous show, run-
ning steadily, once begun, toward its conclusion.  This in turn entails a
separate pre-trial process for the parties enabling them not only to
gather the evidence that they may need at trial but also to prevent
surprise by informing them of the details of all positions the opponent
may advance when the controversy is ultimately presented to the
court.  This solution requires elaborate pre-trial interrogatory and
discovery procedures because once the trial commences, there is no
opportunity to go back, search for further information, and present it
to the court at some later date.40
Clearly, elaborate pre-trial probing of the arguments of fact and
law on which the other party proposes to rely provides a solution to
the surprise problem.  However, this solution is not without its cost.
First, it is intrinsically duplicative.  Witnesses are prepared, examined,
and cross-examined during pre-trial, then prepared, examined, and
cross-examined again at trial.  Second, it tends to be overbroad.  Only
rarely can a litigator tell at the beginning precisely what issues and
what facts will prove important in the end.  Since the judge customar-
ily has little contact with pre-trial investigation, he has no opportunity
to signal what information he thinks relevant to his decision.  As a re-
sult, litigators must strain to investigate and analyse everything that
could possibly arise at trial.  They tend to leave no stone unturned,
provided, of course, as is often the case, that they can charge their
fees by the stone.  Because of their active role in the pre-trial phase,
38. Langbein, Cultural Chauvinism, supra note 31, at 42-44.
39. Reitz, supra note 28, at 996-97.
40. Id. at 1001-07.
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lawyers typically have a greater understanding of the case than does
the judge when the controversy is presented at the trial.  It follows
that lawyers run the show at trial and that they frame the issues, ques-
tion the witnesses, and stage and present even uncontroversial facts as
if in a drama.  Since the judge comes to the trial with little more un-
derstanding of the controversy than he can have from the complaint
and other documents filed with the court, he is hardly in a position to
act as the examiner-in-chief of the witnesses and to confine the scope
of the evidentiary process to those avenues of inquiry he thinks are
relevant or most likely to resolve the dispute.
It would seem therefore that the institution of the jury is the
cause of the strict segmentation of American procedure into pre-trial
and trial compartments, and that this segmentation in turn is the
cause for the waste and duplication of lawyer-dominated pre-trial dis-
covery procedures.  Strengthening the court’s control over the eviden-
tiary process would then be practicable only if the United States fol-
lowed the example of most, if not all, major common law jurisdictions
and abolished the civil jury.  In England, trial by jury has almost dis-
appeared from civil litigation except where a person’s reputation is at
stake, for example where he sues for libel,41 and the civil jury has also
withered to insignificance in Canada42 and Australia,43 not because of
dissatisfaction with its results, but because of the costs and inefficien-
cies imposed by it on the civil litigation process.  Clearly, abandoning
the civil jury or restricting its availability would be a most controver-
sial matter in the United States.  Not only is the right to trial by jury
enshrined in the Seventh Amendment and in comparable state consti-
tutional guarantees.  There is also a substantial body of opinion that
both the criminal and the civil jury are worthwhile bulwarks against
biased, eccentric or incompetent trial judges and enable the public to
take an active part in the administration of both civil and criminal jus-
tice.44
I do not think, however, that the civil jury is the only or even
major villain of the piece.  True, it is because of the jury that the trial
41. See generally Sally Lloyd-Bostock & Cheryl Thomas, Decline of the “Little Parliament”:
Juries and Jury Reform in England and Wales, 62 LAW & CONTEMP.  PROBS.  7 (Spring 1999).
42. See William A.  Bogart, Guardian of Civil Rights . . . Medieval Relic: The Civil Jury in
Canada, 62 LAW & CONTEMP.  PROBS. 305 (Spring 1999).
43. See Michael Tilbury & Harold Luntz, Punitive Damages in Australian Law, 17 LOY.
L.A. INT’L & COMP.  L.J. 769, 775-76 (1995).
44. Id. at 996-97.
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must be carried out as a single-episode courtroom drama, and it is be-
cause of the trial as a concentrated event that pre-trial discovery pro-
cedures are needed to handle the surprise problem.  But it seems to
me that discovery in the form practised today in the United States
goes far beyond the mere prevention of courtroom ambush.  Rather,
discovery allows a party to search and indeed “fish” for information
in opponent’s and non-parties’ hands under a very liberal standard of
relevancy requiring only that the search be “reasonably calculated to
lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.”45  It has been said that it
is possible and by no means rare in the United States for a plaintiff to
bring a lawsuit in order to discover whether he might actually have
one.  Aggressive discovery in the American style is unknown not only
in Continental procedure, but also in English procedure as well.  Of
course, all procedural systems must balance the importance of truth
for the fact-finding process against the need to protect areas of busi-
ness and personal privacy from unreasonable invasion.  But not all
systems will strike the same balance between the two goals.  It is evi-
dent that the breadth of American discovery rules come down more
heavily on the side of privacy in civil litigation.  Judge Rifkind had a
point when he said that “[a] foreigner watching the discovery pro-
ceedings in a civil suit would never suspect that this country has a
highly-prized tradition of privacy enshrined in the fourth amend-
ment.”46
Nonetheless, I think an argument can be made for American dis-
covery methods despite the excesses to which they are prone.  Con-
sider the type of case in which full-dress discovery proceedings will
normally take place.  In many of those cases the lawsuit is not only a
dispute between private individuals about private rights, but also a
grievance about the operation of public policy or the vindication of
the public interest.  In his famous book Democracy in America,
Alexis de Tocqueville noted that “scarcely any political question
arises in the United States that is not resolved, sooner or later, into a
judicial question.”47  This observation seems to have lost none of its
pertinence today.  If a European lawyer looks at the contemporary
legal scene in the United States, he is impressed by the extent to
which court litigation, rather than legislation and administrative ac-
45. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).
46. Simon H. Rifkind, Are We Asking Too Much of Our Courts?, 70 F.R.D. 96, 107 (1976),
quoted in Langbein, German Advantage, supra note 9, at 845.
47. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 280 (1945).
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tion, is used as a means to cure defects in the structures and practices
of important social institutions.  Class actions are a good case in point.
By allowing plaintiffs to sue for the aggregated damages suffered by
many other similarly situated individuals, the class action provides an
effective means of vindicating the rights of groups of people who in-
dividually would not have the strength to bring their opponents into
court.  In this sense, class-action plaintiffs may be viewed as private
attorneys-general advancing and protecting substantial public inter-
ests.  The Supreme Court has described treble damages actions under
section 4 of the Clayton Act as “a vital means of enforcing the anti-
trust policy of the United States”48 and it is not the SEC, but the
shareholders’ derivative suit, that the Supreme Court regarded as
“the chief regulator of corporate management.”49  What surprises the
European observer about American product liability litigation is not
the preconditions for liability, which are just as strict in Europe as in
the United States.  What he finds indeed astonishing is the stupen-
dous volume of litigation, the size of awards made to successful
claimants, and the fact that it is not uncommon for many thousands of
claims to be bundled together and dealt with in a single trial.  All de-
veloped legal systems must ensure the safety of products in the inter-
est of the consumer.  It would seem, however, that Americans, with
their traditional mistrust of governmental authority, rely not so much
on the initiative of administrators or public prosecutors, but rather on
private litigation as the chief regulator of corporate action in the
product safety field.  If this analysis is correct, a strong case can be
made for the view that to the extent to which private litigation serves
the vindication of a public interest, the parties must be equipped with
robust discovery procedures to ferret out the truth, even at the ex-
pense of business or personal privacy.  Nor would it seem plausible to
put the discovery tools in the hands of judges or parajudicial officials,
if only because discovery conducted by a judge or magistrate would
not be as thorough as discovery conducted by the parties’ lawyers.
Civil litigation as a means of vindicating the public interest is by
far less significant in Europe.  Class actions for the recovery of dam-
ages suffered by hundreds or thousands of persons are unknown on
the Continent.  Derivative suits by shareholders, product liability
cases and actions based on a violation of the antitrust law are not un-
48. Perma Life Mufflers Inc. v. Int’l Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 139 (1968).
49. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 547-48 (1949).
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usual, but have nowhere attained the dimension, vigour and force that
would qualify them as significant checks on corporate behaviour.
It is much harder to argue the case for the American civil justice
system where it deals with cases in which the lawsuit is merely a dis-
pute between private individuals about private rights, as, for example,
in an ordinary personal injury action.  True, the vast majority of all
civil matters in the United States do not result in a jury trial, and most
are resolved by settlement.50  In Germany, too, the great majority of
personal injury claims are settled rather than resolved by court deci-
sion.  However, in both systems the parties are bargaining in the
shadow of the law, and the law is very different indeed.  In the United
States due to the cost and number of attorney hours spent on investi-
gating the case and on pretrial motions, discovery, and trial, the eco-
nomic pressure to settle is intense.  Moreover, the outcome of an
American jury trial is less predictable than that of a case tried by a
German judge.  Let me illustrate this by looking at one important
area of the law in which the differences are indeed striking: the law
relating to the assessment of damages for personal injuries.  Legal
doctrine in Germany and the United States does not differ greatly in
most such cases.  Far more significant are differences in the mode of
trial.  Because these cases are tried by a judge alone in Germany, and
damages are assessed by judges, who give full and detailed reasons,
the calculation of damages has become much more regularized, sys-
tematic and uniform in Germany while the range of awards in similar
cases is very much larger in the American system of trial, almost en-
tirely as a result of the use of juries.  Accordingly, the probable range
of damages is less predictable in the United States than in Germany.
Unpredictability leads to uncertainty, and uncertainty increases the
importance of good legal representation, which may be easily avail-
able to repeat players like insurance companies but raises concerns
about access to justice for the poor and procedural equality of liti-
gants with disparate economic resources.
IV.  CONCLUSION
In conclusion I would like to emphasize that what is often over-
looked in the literature on comparative civil procedure is that differ-
ent procedural systems may focus on different categories of cases.
50. See Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, “Most Cases Settle”: Judicial Promotion and Regula-
tion of Settlements, 46 STAN.  L.  REV.  1339 (1994).
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The typical case at which the German system is aimed involves a
comparatively small amount of money, raises no major issue of public
policy, and is merely a dispute between private parties about private
rights.  In such cases it obviously makes sense to give the judge a
leading role in the examination of witnesses and wider powers over
the evidentiary process, thereby reducing considerably the amount of
lawyer effort and cost in exchange for a modest increase in effort and
activity on the part of the judge.  This is where I think the advantages
and the strength of the European procedural systems lie.  If there is a
desire to reform American civil procedure so as to provide effective
justice for the “little guy”, either by making changes within the tradi-
tional system or by developing alternative methods of dispute resolu-
tion, then the Continental experience may well be a worthwhile ob-
ject of study.
